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Abstract: In his article "Ambiguity, the Literary, and Close Reading" David G. Brooks approaches the
matter of literary ambiguity from two directions: firstly by presenting the question of what we might
learn if we look at ambiguity not so much from the angle of the author as that of the reader, a question which may appear obvious and inoffensive on the surface, but which becomes intricate and captivating as Brooks, arguing that literary ambiguity cannot be discussed without attention to the idea of
close reading, peels layer upon layer of commonsensical assumptions away from reading practice, to
arrive at the point where ambiguity, like knowledge itself, can be seen as an affect of desire, and its
resolution not so much a matter of arrival at truth as of exhaustion or relinquishment of pursuit; and
secondly by asking what it is that artifice adds to the semantic operation of the literary text, and proposing that one of the most consistent tributaries to ambiguation in the literary text is to be found in
the veneer or asemantic cross-current created by what Roman Jakobson has called the "poetic function" of language.

David G. Brooks, "Ambiguity, the Literary, and Close Reading"
page 2 of 8
CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 12.4 (2010): <http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/vol12/iss4/9>
Thematic Issue Ambiguity in Culture and Literature. Ed. Paolo Bartoloni and Anthony Stephens

David BROOKS
Ambiguity, the Literary, and Close Reading
Directly or indirectly, literary ambiguity has been a subject of commentary and concern since Aristotle.
Since the nineteenth century it has received more concerted attention, particularly with the advent of
Symbolisme, stimulated by the re-framing of the question of the literary in Poe's "The Philosophy of
Composition" (Poe passim), and reaching a key point in Mallarmé's "Crise de vers." The matter was
re-approached by the New Criticism in the early twentieth century, most notably in Empson's Seven
Types of Ambiguity, and taken to further levels with the coming of deconstruction. Making some use,
in its later stages, of Jakobson's "Closing Statement: Linguistics and Poetics," the argument below is
situated between the Symboliste, Empsonian, and Derridean positions. Attending primarily to the nature of ambiguity itself, it examines, by way of a consideration of close reading, the neglected question of the reader's desire and ability to perceive ambiguity, and then, via Jakobson, considers the "literary" as a matter of what "Art" adds, and what it is that may generate this essentially non- or asemantic cross-current in a text.
There are many modes of literary ambiguity. Any attempt to define such a thing, as if it were a
thing, will find itself either shutting out several others or dealing with many that it might not at first
have intended to deal with. Even at the very outset we must consider that there are two terms to be
addressed, separately, before we try to bring them together, but even this is a simplification. I shall
approach the matter in two parts, examining firstly the question of textual ambiguity and its essential
relation to reading, and then the manner in which this operates within and is further refined by the
literary. We might say, for example, that ambiguity is inherent in the text, but even here we will have
to determine at the outset whether what we mean is that it is an effect produced by certain tropes or
textual practices, or whether it is somehow inherent in textuality itself. We might say, on the other
hand, that ambiguity is an effect of reading, if for no other reason than that nothing can be known
about a text until some attempt has been made to decipher it. But each of these avenues begs the
question of the literary itself: whether by "literary" ambiguity we are referring merely to textual, as
opposed to such other modes of ambiguity as the visual or the aural, or whether we are referring to
modes of ambiguity particular to a certain kind of text, as opposed to other kinds. Do we need, for
example, to consider at the outset where one mode of text — the "literary" — stops and other modes
start?
My principal proposition is that textual ambiguity is in some direct proportion to attentness of
reading (I use the word "attent" as Ted Hughes does, in his poem "Thrushes": "Terrifying are the
attent sleek thrushes on the lawn / More coiled steel than living" 52): that, in a sense, ambiguity is
close reading, if we take "close" reading to be open, as in unmotivated, concerned to find what is
there rather than what we wish to find there, aware at the same time that nothing is there — can be
there — without us, and that we are not in some manner prepared (both as in being ready, and in
having been made ready) to find there. Close reading is dependent upon and motivated by a skepticism toward apparent meanings which takes the form of attempts either to verify apparent meanings,
or to reject or set aside apparent meanings upon solicitation of further information. Whether or not we
can therefore construe close reading as an attempt to find the ultimate or "true" meaning of a text
("true," throughout this article, will be used under erasure, in the absence of a better term), its guiding principle could thus be said to be in attempting to find ambiguity where there appears to be none,
being suspicious of its apparent absence, until and in the hope that one runs into a kind of brick wall,
a point where the text refuses to allow us alternatives: as if, in close reading, we were in some sense
fleeing certainty, albeit in the hope and pursuit of some final, incontrovertible certainty. Hypothetically, this point where the text allows us no alternatives — where no further ambiguity seems to exist,
where no choice of meaning seems apparent — is a point of "truth," a point of "clarity." But we can
never be sure of this. We should all the time be prepared to find that what I have called the brick wall,
when and if at last we reach it, may be in ourselves, and that the "truth" is in this sense something we
do not so much attain at last, as if it were a destination, an object, as it is a point of exhaustion of
energy or imagination, something we can accept only provisionally, as a limit the nature of which is
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not itself ultimately knowable. And where the nature of truth itself remains in question — that is,
whether truth is, in the manner just described, a limit, or simply a point of exhaustion, an end to our
means of seeing beyond it — we cannot speak of an end to ambiguity. Perhaps — and provided that
the "truth" as I have been describing it is something that the reader recognizes — what is ultimately
necessary is some shift in our understanding of "truth" towards something that is perhaps always provisional (although to accept this term "provisional" still places us within the province of that earlier
understanding of "truth," is still to hold the truth from us, still to posit a "further," "deeper" truth that
is not provisional in this way), or, better, as something which is fabricated by, and in this sense is, this
limit or exhaustion, a constantly changing (or at least constantly subject to change) horizon, as in skin
of knowing, made by this pushing, this close reading.
Truth, then, might come in this way to be seen as process, rather than as something abstracted
from process. And meaning, that thing which truth is supposed to give or to allow, will have to be reconstrued accordingly as gerund, as a noun which is also a verb. It is traditional to speak of meaning,
much as we speak of truth, as a thing (albeit very often an abstract thing), an object to be discovered,
something which the reader finds in the text, or extracts from it, rather than something which he or
she makes in collaboration with it. Yet it is arguably far closer to the nature of the act to speak of the
meaning of a text as that activity upon which the reader engages in the process of reading: that the
reader means the text, and that we should speak of meaning as we speak of cooking, say, or swimming (one means the text as one swims the Channel). Thus, the very notion of ambiguity is itself ambiguous: whether, for example, it is a fixed entity, a matter upon which there might be some sort of
consensus, or whether ambiguity is instead a matter of individual perception; whether there can be an
ambiguity that we are unaware of, that we have not yet perceived as such, or whether, by ambiguity,
we mean simply — or also mean — an unresolved question, something that we sense already that we
do not know, something that we understand already that we do not understand. (These latter possibilities are particularly problematic, since they seem to require a knowledge of what we do not know, an
understanding of what we do not understand.) Does there, for example, have to be a particular structure or set of characteristics to or of that thing we don't understand, to or of that not-understanding?
To construe ambiguity as something which has to have certain features in order to be classified as
such in the first place would seem to be rather defeating the point, risking shutting out some of the
very things the term, in other respects, exists in order to describe. I suspect that most of the time we
speak of ambiguity we are referring, if not actually to crude ambiguities, then at least to larger and
more obvious ones, belonging to earlier stages of our investigating, understanding, or meaning something, and that ambiguity is as much a matter of perception as it is of something to be perceived.
To approach this in another way, how can we be sure that something in a text is not ambiguous?
In many instances it would seem appropriate, or at least exigent, to concede that the matters that a
text sets before us are so simple that the issue of possible ambiguity is something that we can put
aside, but in many others it may be that something does not appear to be ambiguous because we do
not choose to see it in this manner, or do not know enough about it to perceive its ambiguity, or that
it has served adequately the purpose we put it to, or simply because we have not looked at it closely
enough. Ambiguity, this is to say, might also be a matter of tolerance and of will to perceive, perhaps
even of will in the first place, by which I do not only mean, although I also mean, that a certain will
and intention are inevitably involved in our acts of perception, and that these might be satisfied before
any ambiguity or question of ambiguity arises. How stable does an ambiguity have to be? Is something truly ambiguous if it is only briefly ambiguous, an ambiguity on its way to becoming something
else? And before we rush into an affirmation here — to say that an ambiguity does not have to be stable, that it can be something on its way to something else — we should be aware that this might, potentially, make ambiguity a stage in any and every act of perception, and so, potentially, something
that exists in proportion to the will or intention to perceive — that it is as much a function of perception as it is something itself to be perceived. And yet, should we take the opposite tack, even a stable
ambiguity may be a contradiction in terms. If an ambiguity is stable — always the same when one
approaches it — is it not arguably something other than an ambiguity? Whatever else it may be, perhaps we should say that ambiguity is, or is something that occurs to — is an obstacle that presents
itself before — an unstable state of knowledge or understanding that is seeking to become a stable
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one. Knowledge is exigent, is always — or is always under suspicion of being — knowledge sufficient
for our purposes. What we deem to be knowledge is not necessarily all that is to be known, but all
that needs to be known, and is often called knowledge, taken to be knowledge, when it has satisfied
such basic requirements as determined our search for it in the first place. When our question has been
answered, this is to say, we are inclined to deem that answer knowledge. No matter that it may not
have been a very informed or intelligent or perceptive or demanding question in the first place, or that
there may have been a great deal more to know. We must, that is, in any discussion of knowing, separate in our own minds the idea of knowing for its own sake, and knowing for particular purposes —
and then, of course, acknowledge the possibility that these things can never really be separated, that
even knowing for its own sake operates within parameters that determine and limit what is to be
found.
Much of the above has implied that reading is a pursuit of knowledge. Whilst I think that this is a
defensible position, I can also see the point in an argument that there are stages to a reading process,
stages that, depending upon the intentions of the reader, might also be seen as categories of reading;
that one reads, initially, a new — as in unfamiliar — text initially in order to set in place for oneself its
broad features, to get a sense, as it were, of the What of the thing before one explores the Why of it
— that one seeks, in Eliot's terms, an apprehension of the thing before one goes about a comprehension of it. But these (again) are broad categories indeed and only serve to give us an apprehension of
the question. In truth, I suspect, both processes are always in play, and it may be better not to pretend that they are separate processes at all. We have — to return to the opening sentence of this paragraph — to define "pursuit," we have to define "knowledge." Things become the less stable — and
the more ambiguous — the more closely we look at them, which is, or has been, precisely my point. It
can be argued that the more one pursues the "truth" into the fabric of a text in this manner, the more
it is the truth of the fabric, rather than of the text, that one finds, and that since all texts are made of
the same basic fabric, language, the closer one's close readings — the further one pursues them —
the more they will tend to converge: because every text, and every meaning that any text attempts
consciously to convey, confesses, betrays or bears traces of its own condition, the no-thing-ness,
meaning-less-ness from which it derives, every text/reading is ultimately the same reading. But this is
only the case if we see the reading as the arrival, not the journey, for the journey is always through
"real" and "local" conditions. It turns our attention again to the ends of reading, and the notion of
"truth" and "meaning" as substantives, entities rather than process, and as we have seen there are
substantial arguments against this. There is also the possibility that the close reader, pursuing the
text this far, will feel — notice — that something else has happened. Every text invokes the world, is
contiguous with it, synecdochic of it, not only in this sense that the nature of textual meaning and
truth reveal the nature of meaning and truth beyond the text, but also — if this is in fact different — in
the sense that every text, opened by the kind of questioning that close reading brings to it, serves as
a window onto something else, something greater, beyond it, is a mode of entry (or exit: the wind
blows both ways). Texts may be made of the same basic fabric, language, but they are made of many
other fabrics as well — or, rather, language, as language, is not the only fiber woven through them.
This, I think, takes us more specifically to the verge of the literary, and so introduces the second part
of my discussion.
But first some reiteration and clarification. It might be argued that this account of literary ambiguity excludes the possibility that there is pleasure to be found in an awareness of ambiguity for its
own sake, a pleasure that does not push toward resolution, since, as I have myself implied, there is
ultimately no final resolution of the text to be elicited. While I would not in any way wish to derogate
such pleasure, and while this position is in one respect very close to my own in its relation of the perception of ambiguity to desire, to see these points as pertinent involves something very much like a
category error. Firstly, it is doubtful whether we can refer to this as an "awareness" of ambiguity, rather than an assumption of it, since something cannot be known to be an ambiguity until it is tested,
and to "know" that something is an ambiguity implies that a "push for resolution" — albeit, as it might
be in such circumstances, a fairly weak or nominal one — has already been made. And secondly —
and setting aside the question as to whether one has in mind that there is a "truth" as in the "true" or
"final" meaning of fiction — it has of course been a premise throughout my argumentation that all
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truths, whether within or beyond what might be designated "fiction," are nonetheless provisional, and
thus potentially "fiction," and I have use the term "truth," accordingly, without any presumed capital
"t." There may be a better term for something so provisional and horizontal — i.e., so much more a
goad to further questioning than an objective one believes one might reach — and readers who feel
that they have found it are most welcome to substitute it.
Although there is no reason why the observations above should not apply to all manner of texts,
one must at the same time admit that the question of close reading is far more likely to arise with certain kinds of texts than with others. It would be risky to attempt to specify these types, but one might
begin with the literary, the sacred, and perhaps the legal. This, of course, has much to do with the
kinds of needs, and questions, that the reader brings to them, but before these it has to do with what
it is, or might be, in "literary" works, that makes people feel they can or should bring such things to
them. Jakobson, in his famous article "Closing Statement: Linguistics and Poetics," speaks of the six
functions of language. Dividing the speech act into six parts — the addresser, the message, the addressee, the context of the message, the contact through which it is made, and the code in which it is
delivered — he attributes a "function" to each: the emotive for the addresser, the conative for the addressee, the referential for the context, the phatic for the contact, the metalingual for the code. For
the message itself, he speaks of the poetic function: "focus on the message for its own sake, is the
poetic function of language. This function cannot be productively studied out of touch with the general
problems of language, and, on the other hand, the scrutiny of language requires a thorough consideration of its poetic function. Any attempt to reduce the sphere of poetic function to poetry or to confine
poetry to poetic function would be a delusive oversimplification. Poetic function is not the sole function
of verbal art but only its dominant, determining function, whereas in all other verbal activities it acts
as a subsidiary, accessory constituent. This function, by promoting the palpability of signs, deepens
the fundamental dichotomy of signs and objects. Hence, when dealing with poetic function, linguistics
cannot limit itself to the field of poetry" (1263-64).
We might note the first half of the fourth sentence here, that "Poetic function is not the sole function of verbal art but only its dominant, determining function," and, noting also the central positioning
of the word "art," draw out the clear assertion that this half-sentence makes, i.e. that poetic function
is the dominant, determining function of verbal art. Jakobson gives three examples to establish the
nature of this poetic function. Odd and contentious as they are, it might help us to look at them:
"Why do you always say Joan and Margery, yet never Margery and Joan? Do you prefer Joan to her twin sister?"
"Not at all, it just sounds smoother." In a sequence of two coordinate names, as far as no rank problems interfere,
the precedence of the shorter name suits the speaker, unaccountably for him, as a well-ordered shape of the message. A girl used to talk about "the horrible Harry." "Why horrible?" "Because I hate him." "But why not dreadful,
terrible, frightful, disgusting?" "I don't know why, but horrible fits better." Without realizing it, she clung to the
poetic device of paronomasia. The political slogan "I like Ike" … succinctly structured, consists of three monosyllables and counts three diphthongs … each of them symmetrically followed by one consonantal phoneme … The
make-up of the three words presents a variation: no consonantal phonemes in the first word, two around the diphthong in the second, and one final consonant in the third. A similar dominant nucleus … was noticed by Hymes in
some of the sonnets of Keats. Both cola of the trisyllabic formula "I like / Ike" rhyme with each other, and the second of the two rhyming words is fully included in the first one (echo rhyme) … a paronomastic image of a feeling
which totally envelops its object. (1264)

The poetic function, in short, is language looking at itself, composing itself in the mirror of itself.
Jakobson makes quite clear that he isn't speaking of poetry alone, but of literary art more generally. It is the centrality of this "poetic" function which distinguishes the "literary" from the "non-literary"
in the first place, though this of course, as he seems also to admit, is to beg the question of degree —
that is, that every text, every act of communication for that matter, manifests the poetic function to
some extent (see, e.g., Barthes's description of intertextuality in his "The Death of the Author": the
idea that all our communications are influenced by communications we have heard in the past, and a
judgment as to which of them have been more effective [1468]). This of course still begs a further
and equally important question, as to what mysterious powers — we, probably, as people who discuss
such things (or perhaps it is, after all, market forces, the publishers, the "literary" agents) — deter-
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mine the point at which a text manifests this function sufficiently for it to enter the realms of the "literary," but the basic point should be fairly clear, that it is this, the poetic function, which, the question
of degree aside, distinguishes the literary from the non-literary text: novels, plays, look into their own
mirrors, if not just as much then at least in the same kinds of ways in which poems do.
Although he might have been the first to name it such, Jakobson was hardly the first to have noted this function. Indeed some had turned it into a matter of mystery, even mysticism. Poe addressed
this same issue in slightly different terms in his essay "The Philosophy of Composition" implying that
language has its own mysteries, and that one can only discover them if one can quell the human desire to manipulate that language for its own purposes in things like messages, etc. (744-45). Perhaps
Poe had discovered, and simply thought about a little further, something that most writers in almost
any genre discover, that the text sometimes seems to have a mind of its own: that what the poet
wants to do with a poem, for example, or wants the poem to do, is not always what the poem itself
seems to want to do. It is this apparent will, this apparent mind, in the textual object, and in particular in the poetic object, that intrigued the Symbolistes, leading Mallarmé (849) to go so far as to suggest that the real point of poetry was to expose and express this mind, and that the poem only really
pursued its own purposes when — did not really come into being until — the "message" or "meaning"
function had been stilled. If the point of the poem is to convey — encode — a message, and the point
of reading the poem is to extract that message, then why go to the trouble of putting it into — hiding
it within — the poem in the first place? Why not simply scrawl the message on a scrap of paper and be
done with it? Is it not the point of poetry, as poetry, something else, something other than message?
Of course, some will say that the poetic function exists in order to enhance the message, to ensure
that it is presented in its most powerful form, and certainly that is a classical position — "what oft was
thought but ne'er so well express'd" (Pope, "An Essay on Criticism" l. 298) — but, and it would be
hard for me to explain why, even if I could, in just a few sentences, I think that this won't wash. Not
only is it a little like asserting, by the back door (and much as we might secretly appreciate it when it
seems to be so), the transparency of language, which, after Lacan, Kristeva, Derrida, is hard to do,
but it does nothing to explain the power itself, and, as far as the matter of ambiguity is concerned, it
leads us into a rather strange place.
The very concern to discuss ambiguity, the perception that there is ambiguity, that some things
are ambiguous in a literary text, bespeaks a desire for meaning — I do not yet speak of a clarification
of meaning — that, if Jakobson and Poe and Mallarmé et al are even to a slight extent right, may be a
sort of literary misprision, a misprision of or about the literary text in the reader/critic's mind in the
first place, a sense that meaning is or should be in some manner one of the text's principal concerns,
when, when it comes to distinguishing the "literary" from the "non," it might be something quite different that we have to call upon. Of course, to throw out the question of meaning from the literary
text is very close to absurd, and I am not really suggesting any such thing. I argue as I do only to
highlight the issue of what art adds. In as much as one looks for and finds "meaning" in a literary text
(and of course one does; that is the point, after all), it will derive from a combined effect of the signifiers of "meaning" or "message" that the artist has intentionally or inadvertently placed there — his or
her attempt to convey — and what art, this textual looking-in-the-mirror, adds.
What art adds is complicated and multifarious. It is, if you like, the whole field of what Jakobson
has called the poetic function of language, provided we realize that his own examples are very slight
indeed, and only the beginnings of an exploration of this area. My intention is not to elaborate them,
but to offer something else about — an alternate approach to — ambiguity. Each of these many, many
things that one could list in the arsenal of the poetic function is, after all, a sign. The "I" of "Ike," for
example, and the way it is echoed in "like," etc., is a sign, just as is the repetition of an image or motif
or brief structural signature in a novel. And these signs not only taunt us, haunt us, into our old habits
of meaning (gerund), or meaning-making, but they also overlay any signs that the author, or the
whole system of authorship, all the authors that make up the author, might have set down for us. At
the very least, or very best, this gives us, as it were, two layers of suggestion that are not aligned —
it is hard to see how they could be, or indeed why they should be — and when we find layers of meaning or signification that are not aligned we have ambiguity. What art adds could in this sense be said
to be a kind of glaze over the level at which "message" might be said to function, a glaze which does
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not necessarily obscure the message, but seems to haunt it with something that it (the message) is
not. That very thing which might be said to distinguish the "literary" from the "non-literary" — and
again I would emphasize that this is always and only a matter of degree, arbitrated by fashion, by the
market, as much as by any clear laws of genre — brings to it and ensures it of, an inherent destabilization which is, surely, a precondition of ambiguity in the first place.
As a way of conclusion, it might help us to determine a little more about the nature of this ambiguity to contemplate briefly the question as to where the devices we normally identify with the poetic
function — assonance, say, and alliteration, repetition, return, permutation, paronomasia, etc., and
perhaps more importantly the metrical and rhythmical events that underpin and extend these — come
from. They may have their origin, as many have speculated, in oral culture, in mnemonic devices, devices to enable people to remember the text in the first place. They may have — and this is not an
either/or matter — their origins in music, and represent an ekphrasis-like desire within every text at
one and the same time to admit and to stretch the skin, the limits of language. But the origins of at
least some of these devices may be even earlier and more primal. I myself am inclined to think that
what the poetic function actually does is to remind us of, to bring to or represent within the text,
something of the liminal space at the edge or threshold of language. In searching for a conclusion to
this paper — trying to conclude the unconcludable — I remembered a passage I had written in one of
my notebooks several years ago, in which I expressed this point better than I could do right now, and
so I think I might end with it:
A place. A site. It is 5.00am. Since 3.39 I have been lying awake and for the last hour or more going over and over
in my mind the same few lines of a poem I began yesterday. Obsessively, over and over, though I think already I
have done all I can with them. As if — as has only just occurred to me — it were not the words themselves, not the
meaning of them, so much as something in the rhythm, or the sequence of sounds. All of my writing life I have
done this … a few lines, a sentence, sometimes only a few words or phrases, as if the activity, the mind's action
with these words, these rhythms, somehow sustained me — or as if one were not only trying to polish them (that
is often already done), or even to try to get used to them … but somehow trying to get through them. I thought I
knew this before: that one was trying to get through them, as in along them, to what might or should come after
them, as if by simple, obsessive repetition they could be forced to grow into whatever they seemed to be holding
within themselves, or break through the barrier at the (temporary) end of them — some organic-cum-Deep-Image
theory of poetry — but have only just now realized that "through" in this other sense: of going through the lines or
phrases to something behind the rhythm and sound and fragmentariness (the deep but incomplete meaningness of
the fragment): to something of which it is the token and residue. Because only just now has it occurred to me that
it might have a connection, its roots, in something far earlier, the moment or hour, or maybe it is the weeks or
months, when one first falls in love with language, the rhythms of it, the sequence of sounds (as I remember my
own child doing, repeating the same simple sequence of sounds ad nauseam in the back seat of the car...), and
presumably, plausibly, goes over them obsessively like this, and that one of the things we do, or at least I do, in
writing, is to go back to, or try to get back to — or perhaps it is to recreate, reiterate — this place or site or time:
that one remembers it, even when — mostly when — one does not know that it is memory, and that that is what
one is doing. And a further thought, an extension of this: that that moment, that obsession, that love, is a kind of
bridge, belonging as it does as much to an earlier, pre-linguistic time, as it does to the time after it, when language
would become all that it does; that for a moment, then, language, before one really has it, is a thing, a new discovery in, and so, briefly, a part of, that earlier place, not this. And that, in this way, in the making of poems, as
presumably, in some other aspect, in the making of stories, one is (also) going back, however much one might also
be trying to go forward.
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